Debt contract strictness and auditor specialization

The conflicts of interest among managers, shareholders and creditors resulting in agency costs, can be mitigated by restricting managers’ adverse behavior, through financial covenants to better align the various stakeholder interests. Thus, debt contract strictness represents an important aspect of agency costs between creditors, shareholders, and management that is not always captured by interest rates. The contract setting provides a unique opportunity to investigate how creditors may rely on auditors to alleviate information uncertainty stemming from reliance on management's financial reporting and thus alleviate the creditor's potential loss of invested capital. After controlling for borrower risks, loan characteristics, and audit factors, we show that auditor industry specialization is significantly associated with a reduction in the strictness of debt contracts, consistent with creditors viewing certain industry expert auditors as effective monitors against financial reporting manipulation aimed at the avoidance of debt covenant triggers that protect creditors against potential loss. Further, we find that the association between loan strictness and auditor specialization is attenuated by stronger corporate governance systems, external monitors, and prior lender relationships.     

Leader Apology in the Employee–Organization Relationship: The Roles of Subordinate Power Distance Belief and Leader Competence

According to the organizational support theory, leaders' words and deeds are not only the products of their own will but also a reflection of organizations' standpoints. We thus focus on leader apology in the case of organizational transgressions and predict that leaders' apologetic acts are likely to influence employees' organization-oriented attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, leader apology is hypothesized to positively influence employees' perception of organizational support, which in turn, is positively associated with employees' helping and risk taking behavior. Furthermore, drawing upon the organizational support theory that delineates the discretion and value perceived in the employee-organization relationship, we further propose that employees' perceived leader competence and power distance belief serve as two contingencies that influence the relationship between leader apology and employees' perceived organizational support. In particular, this relationship is stronger when employees perceive higher leader competence or hold stronger power distance beliefs. Two multi-wave data collected from hospitality employees support these hypotheses. The findings provide a new perspective to comprehending leader apology within the employee-organization relationship wherein leaders are considered as organizational agents. This research extends the existing literature on leader apology that largely focuses on leader apology following leaders’ transgressions and leader-oriented outcomes.     

Why do auditors fail? What might work? What won’t?†

Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the conflicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns. Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced personnel.

What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation. Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’ of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist shareholders and diversified shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.     

Auditors' Responses to Workload Imbalance and the Impact on Audit Quality*

Using detailed data for fieldwork hours and audit hours by rank from audit engagements in Korea, we examine whether audits conducted under workload imbalance, proxied by busy‐season audits, impair audit quality, and how auditors adjust staff assignments for busy‐season audits. We generally find that busy‐season audits are associated with lower audit quality, and that audit firms reduce the involvement of senior auditors during busy‐season audits. In addition, the greater the involvement of senior auditors and junior auditors, the lesser the deterioration in audit quality. Finally, although there is no increase in interim audits in response to workload imbalance during busy seasons, increasing interim audits can mitigate the negative impact of busy‐season audits on audit quality. Our results are relevant to auditors and regulators, who have expressed concerns about the adverse effects of workload imbalance on audit quality.     

品牌拟人形象性别一致性和品牌态度关系研究：品牌热情与能力类型的调节作用

三个实验检验了品牌拟人形象性别与目标消费者性别一致性的积极效应以及品牌热情能力定位对其的调节作用。结果表明：出于社会认同动机，当性别刻板印象未被激活时，消费者对于拟人形象和自身性别一致的品牌态度更加积极。而当性别热情能力刻板印象被激活时，性别一致性的积极效应被品牌热情能力定位调节。具体而言，对于男性消费者，相对于能力型品牌，热情型品牌由于和男性高能力低热情刻板印象不同，男性消费者对男性拟人形象的社会认同降低，品牌拟人形象与消费者性别一致性对社会认同和品牌态度的积极效应消失；而对于女性消费者，与传统刻板印象相反的高能力低热情的女性拟人形象并未对她们的社会认同及品牌态度产生负面影响。     

连锁企业核心扩散与共生效应分析

研究连锁经营的核心扩散机理旨在揭示连锁单元扩张的内在规律。连锁经营就是要使核心能力通过连锁机制和连锁单元得以充分发挥,使它的经济运行效率达到可能的最优状态;连锁经营可以克服单体经营的有限性,从而大大提高经营效率,使连锁经营的生存能力和扩张能力提高,从中国连锁经营发展的进程来看,影响连锁单元增长速度的主要原因还是连锁总部的核心能力和连锁环境条件,而不是业内之间的竞争。     

高绩效工作系统能否抑制员工沉默?

在自我决定理论的基础上探讨高绩效工作系统对不同动机员工沉默行为的影响机制及差异性。研究结果表明：（1）高绩效工作系统对员工默许沉默、防御沉默和漠视沉默行为具有显著的抑制作用；（2）高绩效工作系统能通过自主需求满意度、能力需求满意度和关系需求满意度的提升降低员工的默许沉默行为；（3）高绩效工作系统能通过关系需求满意度的提升降低员工的防御沉默行为；（4）高绩效工作系统通过自主需求满意度、能力需求满意度和关系需求满意度的提升降低员工的漠视沉默行为。     

审计师行业专长对审计重要性水平的影响——基于股权性质的调节作用研究

审计师行业专长意味着在特定领域较强的专业胜任能力,对于防范审计风险和提高审计质量都有显著影响。围绕审计师行业专长影响审计重要性水平这一主题，结合股权性质的调节作用，选取2016—2018年沪深两市A股上市公司作为研究对象，进行实证检验。结果表明，审计师行业专长对重要性水平有正向影响，如果被审计单位是国有控股上市公司，审计师行业专长与重要性水平的正相关关系更显著。这对审计机构人力资源配置、监管部门完善相关制度及监督工作具有参考价值。     

财务重述与审计师变更——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2003--2011年我国主板上市公司为样本，从市场声誉和信号传递的角度，对上市公司财务重述与审计师变更问题予以分析和解答。本文研究结果显示，相比于非财务重述公司而言，财务重述公司更可能变更审计师，且变更概率与重述的严重程度显著正相关，此外，就变更审计师的公司而言，财务重述公司比非重述公司更可能从小所变更为大所或在平级所之间进行变更。在此研究基础上，本文提出相应的政策建议。     

Firms’ performance following the initial resignation of independent directors: evidence from Taiwan

This study investigates the operating performance of firms listed on the Taiwan stock exchange following the initial resignation of independent directors. The results show that the firms’ operating performance following the resignation of these directors has not only deteriorated, but is also significantly below the industry average. In addition, firms with a relatively severe agency problem, including firms that have lower insider or institutional shareholdings, receive audit opinions other than unqualified opinions or change their auditors prior to the resignation of the independent directors, tend to perform more poorly following the resignation.